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Iran–United States relations

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Iran–United States relations
Map indicating locations of Iran and United States

Iran
United States
Diplomatic mission
Interests Section in the
Pakistani Embassy,
Washington, D.C.		Interests Section in the
Swiss Embassy,
Tehran
Envoy
Director of the Interest Section Mehdi AtefatUnited States Special Representative for Iran Abram Paley

Relations between Iran and the United Statesbegan in the mid-to-late 19th century, when Iran was known to the west as Qajar Persia. Persia was very wary of British and Russian colonial interests during the Great Game. By contrast, the United States was seen as a more trustworthy foreign power, and the Americans Arthur Millspaugh and Morgan Shuster were even appointed treasurers-general by the Shahs of the time. During World War II, Persia was invaded by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, both US allies, but relations continued to be positive after the war until the later years of the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was overthrown by a coup organized by the Central Intelligence Agency and aided by MI6. This was followed by an era of close alliance between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's authoritarian regime and the US government,[1] Persia being one of the US's closest allies during the Cold War,[2][3][4] which was in turn followed by a dramatic reversal and disagreement between the two countries after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[1][5]

The two nations have had no formal diplomatic relations since 7 April 1980.[1] Instead, Pakistan serves as Iran's protecting power in the United States, while Switzerland serves as the United States' protecting power in Iran. Contacts are carried out through the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C.,[6] and the US Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.[7] In August 2018, Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei banned direct talks with the United States.[8] According to the US Department of Justice, Iran has since attempted to assassinate US officials and dissidents, including US President Donald Trump.[9][10]

Iranian explanations for the animosity with the United States include “the natural and unavoidable conflict between the Islamic system” and “such an oppressive power as the United States, which is trying to establish a global dictatorship and further its own interests by dominating other nations and trampling on their rights”, as well as the United States support for Israel ("the Zionist entity").[11][12] In the West, however, different explanations have been considered,[1] including the Iranian government's need for an external bogeyman to furnish a pretext for domestic repression against pro-democratic forces and to bind the government to its loyal constituency.[13] The United States attributes the worsening of relations to the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis,[1] Iran's repeated human rights abuses since the Islamic Revolution, different restrictions on using spy methods on democratic revolutions by the US, its anti-Western ideology and its nuclear program.[14][15]

Since 1995, the United States has had an embargo on trade with Iran.[16] In 2015, the United States led successful negotiations for a nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) intended to place substantial limits on Iran's nuclear program, including IAEA inspections and limitations on enrichment levels. In 2016, most sanctions against Iran were lifted.[17][18][19] The Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal and re-imposed sanctions in 2018, initiating what became known as the "maximum pressure campaign" against Iran.[20] In response, Iran gradually reduced its commitments under the nuclear deal and eventually exceeded pre-JCPOA enrichment levels.[21]

According to a 2013 BBC World Service poll, 5% of Americans view Iranian influence positively, with 87% expressing a negative view, the most unfavorable perception of Iran in the world.[22] On the other hand, research has shown that most Iranians hold a positive attitude about the American people, though not the US government.[23][24] According to a 2019 survey by IranPoll, 13% of Iranians have a favorable view of the United States, with 86% expressing an unfavourable view, the most unfavorable perception of the United States in the world.[25] According to a 2018 Pew poll, 39% of Americans say that limiting the power and influence of Iran should be a top foreign policy priority.[26] Relations tend to improve when the two countries have overlapping goals, such as repelling Sunni militants during the Iraq War and the intervention against the Islamic State in the region.[27]

Early historical relations

[edit]

American newspapers in the 1720s were uniformly pro-Iranian, especially during the revolt of Afghan emir Mahmud Hotak (r. 1722–1725) against the Safavid dynasty.[28]

Political relations between Qajar Persia and the United States began when the Shah of Iran, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Iran's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan, to Washington, D.C. in 1856.[29] In 1883, Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran; however, ambassadorial relations were not established until 1944.[29]

The US had little interest in Persian affairs, while the US as a trustworthy outsider did not suffer. The Persians again sought the US for help in straightening out its finances after World War I. This mission was opposed by powerful vested interests and eventually was withdrawn with its task incomplete.[30]

Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the US as a "third force" in their struggle to expel British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and to expel British and Russian influence from the country.[31]

20th century relations

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During the Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1909, American Howard Baskerville died in Tabriz while fighting with a militia in a battle against royalist forces.[32] After the Iranian parliament appointed United States financier Morgan Shuster as Treasurer General of Iran in 1911, an American was killed in Tehran by gunmen thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more active in supporting the Constitutional Revolution of Iran financially.[33]

The American Embassy first reported to the Iran desk at the Foreign Office in London about the popular view of Britain's involvement in the 1921 coup that brought Reza Shah to power.[34][35]

In 1936, Iran withdrew its ambassador in Washington for nearly one year after the publication of an article criticizing Reza Shah in the New York Daily Herald.[36]

Reign of the last Shah of Iran

[edit]

Iran's border with the Soviet Union, and its position as the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, made Iran a "pillar" of US foreign policy in the Middle East.[37] Prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, many Iranian citizens, especially students, resided in the United States and had a positive and welcoming attitude toward America and Americans.[5] In the 1970s, approximately 25,000 American technicians were deployed to Iran to maintain military equipment (such as F-14s) that had been sold to the Shah's government.[38] From 1950 to 1979, an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 Americans had visited or lived in Iran, and had often expressed their admiration for the Iranian people.[5]

Pahlavi Iran–United States relations
Map indicating locations of Imperial State of Iran and United States

Iran
United States
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Iran, Washington, D.C.Embassy of the United States, Tehran

Prime Minister Mossadeq and his overthrow

[edit]

In 1953, the government of prime minister Mohammed Mossadeq was overthrown in a coup organized by the CIA and MI6. Many liberal Iranians believe that the coup and the subsequent U.S. support for the shah proved largely responsible for his arbitrary rule, which led to the "deeply anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution.[39] One result of the 1953 coup was that the U.S. took about 40% of Britain's share of Iranian oil, as part of the wider transition from British to American dominance in the region and worldwide.[40]

Until the outbreak of World War II, the United States had no active policy toward Iran.[41] When the Cold War began, the United States was alarmed by the attempt by the Soviet Union to set up separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as well as its demand for military rights to the Dardanelles in 1946. This fear was enhanced by the loss of China to communism, the uncovering of Soviet spy rings, and the start of the Korean War.[42]

U.S. President Harry S. Truman pressed Britain to moderate its position in the negotiations and to not invade Iran. American policies created a feeling in Iran that the United States was on Mossadeq's side and optimism that the oil dispute would soon be settled with "a series of innovative proposals", giving Iran "significant amounts of economic aid". Mossadeq visited Washington, and the American government made "frequent statements expressing support for him."[43]

At the same time, the United States honored the British embargo and, without Truman's knowledge, the Central Intelligence Agency station in Tehran had been "carrying out covert activities" against Mosaddeq and the National Front "at least since the summer of 1952".[44]

1953 Iranian coup d'état

[edit]
Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état
President Lyndon Johnson welcoming the Shah at the White House while Iranians protest, 1967

In 1953, the U.S. and Britain orchestrated a coup to overthrow Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, fearing communist influence and economic instability after Iran nationalized its oil industry. The coup, led by the CIA and MI6, initially failed but succeeded on a second attempt, reinstalling the Shah, who received significant U.S. financial and military support. The U.S. helped establish SAVAK, the Shah’s brutal secret police, to maintain his rule. While initially seen as a Cold War success, the coup later became a source of deep resentment, with critics calling it a blow to democracy and a lasting stain on U.S.-Iran relations.

Nuclear support

[edit]

The U.S. helped Iran create its nuclear program in 1957 by providing Iran its first nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel, and after 1967 by providing Iran with weapons grade enriched uranium.[45][46][47]

Iran's nuclear program was launched as part of the Atoms for Peace program.[46] The participation of the U.S. and Western European governments continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[48] After that while the non-aligned nations had actively supported Iran's right to enrich uranium for years, the U.S. and E.U. assert that Iran poses the greatest threat to international peace. The United States has reported Arab support for its stance on Iran here.[a] However, in multiple polls,[b] Arab people have indicated that they do not see it as a serious threat. They consider Israel and America a danger.[40] The United States reached a deal in 2015 to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities. Sanctions relief under the terms of the deal freed over 100 billion dollars in frozen assets overseas for Iran and increased foreign access to the Iranian economy. In return, Iran agreed not to engage in certain activities, including research and development of a nuclear bomb. The United States withdrew from the deal in 2018.[40]

Cultural relations

[edit]

Relations in the cultural sphere remained cordial until 1979. Pahlavi University, Sharif University of Technology, and Isfahan University of Technology, three of Iran's top academic universities, were directly modeled on private American institutions such as the University of Chicago, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania.[49][50] The Shah was generous in awarding American universities with financial gifts. For example, the University of Southern California received an endowed chair of petroleum engineering, and a million dollar donation was given to the George Washington University to create an Iranian Studies program.[49]

Growth of oil revenues

[edit]

In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably. Starting in the mid-1960s, this "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" while strengthening the power of the Iranian state vis-a-vis the Iranian public. According to scholar Homa Katouzian, this put the United States "in the contradictory position of being regarded" by the Iranian public "as the chief architect and instructor of the regime," while "its real influence" in domestic Iranian politics and policies "declined considerably".[51]

James Bill and other historians have said that between 1969 and 1974 U.S. President Richard Nixon actively recruited the Shah as an American puppet and proxy.[52] However, Richard Alvandi argues that it worked the other way around, with the Shah taking the initiative. President Nixon, who had first met the Shah in 1953, regarded him as a westernizing anticommunist statesman who deserved American support now that the British were withdrawing from the region. They met in 1972 and the Shah agreed to buy large quantities of American military hardware, and took responsibility for ensuring political stability and fighting off Soviet subversion throughout the region.[53]

Carter administration 1977-1981

[edit]
See also: Jimmy Carter's engagement with Ruhollah Khomeini
The Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi meeting with Alfred Atherton, William H. Sullivan, Cyrus Vance, President Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1977
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, shakes hands with a US Air Force general officer prior to his departure from the United States

In the late 1970s, American President Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights in his foreign policy, but went easy in private with the Shah.[54] By 1977, Iran had garnered unfavorable publicity in the international community for its bad human rights record.[55] That year, the Shah responded to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the Shah's regime.[56][57]

Carter angered anti-Shah Iranians with a New Year's Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he said:

Under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more.[58]

Observers disagree over the nature of United States policy toward Iran under Carter as the Shah's regime crumbled. According to historian Nikki Keddie, the Carter administration followed "no clear policy" on Iran.[59] The US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully". At the same time, officials in the State Department believed the revolution was unstoppable.[60] After visiting the Shah in 1978, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse.[61] Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in assurances that the Shah would receive military support.

Sociologist Charles Kurzman argues that the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'état".[62][63]

Islamic Revolution

[edit]
Further information: Iran–United States relations after 1979

The Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) ousted the Shah and replaced him with the anti-American Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[64] The United States government State Department and intelligence services "consistently underestimated the magnitude and long-term implications of this unrest".[65] Six months before the revolution culminated, the CIA had produced a report stating that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation."[66][67]

Revolutionary students feared the power of the United States, particularly the CIA, to overthrow a new Iranian government. One source of this concern was a book by CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt Jr. titled Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. Many students had read excerpts from the book and thought that the CIA would attempt to implement this countercoup strategy.[68]

Khomeini referred to America as the "Great Satan"[69] and instantly got rid of the Shah's prime minister, replacing him with politician Mehdi Bazargan. Until this point, the Carter administration was still hoping for normal relationships with Iran, sending its National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The Islamic revolutionaries wished to extradite and execute the ousted Shah, and Carter refused to give him any further support or help return him to power. The Shah, suffering from terminal cancer, requested entry into the United States for treatment. The American embassy in Tehran opposed the request, as they were intent on stabilizing relations between the new interim revolutionary government of Iran and the United States.[57] However, President Carter agreed to let the Shah in, after pressure from Henry Kissinger, Nelson Rockefeller and other pro-Shah political figures. Iranians' suspicion that the Shah was actually trying to conspire against the Iranian Revolution grew; thus, this incident was often used by the Iranian revolutionaries to justify their claims that the former monarch was an American puppet, and this led to the storming of the American embassy by radical students allied with Khomeini.[57]

The hostage crisis and its consequences

[edit]
Main article: Iran hostage crisis
Vice President George H. W. Bush and other VIPs wait to welcome the former hostages to Iran home

On November 4, 1979, Iranian student revolutionaries, with Ayatollah Khomeini’s approval, seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days in response to the U.S. granting asylum to the deposed Shah. The crisis, seen in Iran as a stand against American influence and in the U.S. as a violation of diplomatic law, led to failed rescue attempts and lasting damage to Iran-U.S. relations. Six Americans escaped via the CIA-Canadian "Canadian Caper" operation, later dramatized in the film Argo.
As a response to the seizure of the embassy, Carter's Executive Order 12170 froze about $12 billion in Iranian assets,[70] including bank deposits, gold and other properties. They were the first of a number of international sanctions against Iran.[71]

Families wait for the former hostages to disembark the plane

The crisis ended with the Algiers Accords in January 1981. Under the terms of the agreement and Iran's compliance, the hostaged diplomats were allowed to leave Iran. One of the chief provisions of the Accords was that the United States would lift the freeze on Iranian assets and remove trade sanctions.[72] The diplomatic ties remain severed, with Switzerland and Pakistan handling each country's interests.

Reagan administration 1981–1989

[edit]

Iran–Iraq War

[edit]
See also: United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War

American intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in arming Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War. However, Bob Woodward states that the United States gave information to both sides, hoping "to engineer a stalemate".[73] In search for a new set or order in this region, Washington adopted a policy designed to contain both sides economically and militarily.[74] During the second half of the Iran–Iraq War, the Reagan administration pursued several sanction bills against Iran; on the other hand, it established full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist government in Iraq by removing it from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984.[74] According to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, the administrations of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous dual-use items, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.[75] The Iran–Iraq War ended with both agreeing to a ceasefire in 1988.

1983: Hezbollah bombings

[edit]
Main articles: Hezbollah military activities, 1983 US embassy bombing in Beirut, and 1983 Beirut barracks bombings

Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shi'ite Islamist group, has carried out multiple anti-American attacks, including the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut (killing 63, including 17 Americans), the Beirut barracks bombing (killing 241 U.S. Marines), and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. U.S. courts have ruled Iran responsible for these attacks, with evidence showing Hezbollah operated under Iran’s direction and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the Khobar Towers bombing.

1983: Anti-communist purge

[edit]

According to the Tower Commission report:

In 1983, the U.S. helped bring to the attention of Tehran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, that virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran.[76]

Iran–Contra Affair

[edit]
Further information: Iran–Contra affair

To evade congressional rules regarding an arms embargo, officials in President Ronald Reagan's administration arranged in the mid-1980s to sell arms to Iran in an attempt to improve relations and obtain their influence in the release of hostages held in Lebanon. Oliver North of the National Security Council diverted proceeds from the arms sale to fund anti-Marxist Contra rebels in Nicaragua.[77][78] In November 1986, Reagan issued a statement denying the arms sales.[79] One week later, he confirmed that weapons had been transferred to Iran, but denied that they were part of an exchange for hostages.[78] Later investigations by Congress and an independent counsel disclosed details of both operations and noted that documents relating to the affair were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials on national security grounds.[80][81]

United States attack of 1988

[edit]
Main article: Iran–Iraq War § Attacks on shipping

In 1988, the U.S. launched Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation for Iran mining the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War, following Operation Nimble Archer. It was the largest American naval operation since World War II, with strikes that destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and sank a major warship. Iran sought reparations at the International Court of Justice, but the court dismissed the claim. The attack helped pressure Iran into agreeing to a ceasefire with Iraq later that year.

1988: Iran Air Flight 655

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Main article: Iran Air Flight 655

On July 3, 1988, during the Iran–Iraq War, the U.S. Navy's USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655, a civilian Airbus A300B2, killing 290 people. The U.S. initially claimed the aircraft was a warplane and outside the civilian air corridor, but later acknowledged the downing was an accident in a combat zone. Iran, however, argued it was gross negligence and sued the U.S. in the International Court of Justice, resulting in compensation for the victims' families. The U.S. expressed regret, calling it a tragic accident, while the Vincennes crew received military honors.

George H. W. Bush administration 1989–1993

[edit]

Newly elected U.S. president George H. W. Bush announced a "goodwill begets goodwill" gesture in his inaugural speech on 20 January 1989. The Bush administration urged President of Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to use Iran's influence in Lebanon to obtain the release of the remaining US hostages held by Hezbollah. Bush indicated there would be a reciprocal gesture toward Iran by the United States.[82]

Relevant background events during the first year of Bush's administration include the ending of the Iran–Iraq War and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.[83] Khomeini believed he had a sacred duty to purge Iran of what he saw as Western corruption and moral decay, aiming to restore the country to religious purity under Islamic theocratic rule.[83]
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait,[83] which led to the Gulf War. The U.S. persuaded Iran to vote in favor of UN resolution 678 - which issued an ultimatum for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait - by promising to lift its objections to a series of World Bank loans. The first loan, totaling $250 million, was approved just one day before the ground assault on Iraq began.[84] The war ended on 28 February 1991.[83]

Clinton administration 1993–2001

[edit]
See also: Dual containment

In April 1995, a total embargo on dealings with Iran by American companies was imposed by President Bill Clinton. This ended trade, which had been growing following the end of the Iran–Iraq War.[85] The next year, the American Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act, designed to prevent other countries from making large investments in Iranian energy. The act was denounced by the European CC as invalid.[86]

Khatami and Iranian reformers

[edit]

In January 1998, newly elected Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States. In the interview, Khatami invoked Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to explain similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded positively. This brought free travel between the countries as well as an end to the American embargo of Iranian carpets and pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and support for terrorism.[87]

Inter-Parliamentary (Congress-to-Majlis) informal talks

[edit]

On August 31, 2000, four United States Congress members, Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, Representative Gary Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in New York City with several Iranian leaders. The Iranians included Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament); Maurice Motamed, a Jewish member of the Majlis; and three other Iranian parliamentarians.[88]

George W. Bush administration, 2001–2009

[edit]
Main article: Iran–United States relations during the G.W. Bush administration

Iran–United States relations during the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) were marked by heightened tensions, mutual distrust, and periodic attempts at limited engagement. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Iran initially was sympathetic with the United States.[89] However, relations deteriorated sharply after President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002, accusing the country of pursuing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the U.S.[90][91] In 2003, Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann relayed an unofficial proposal to the U.S. outlining a possible "grand bargain" with Iran. He claimed it was developed in cooperation with Iran, but it lacked formal Iranian endorsement, and the Bush administration did not pursue the offer.[92][93][94]

Between 2003 and 2008, Iran accused the United States of repeatedly violating its territorial sovereignty through drone incursions,[95][96] covert operations, and support for opposition groups.[97][98] In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. During his presidency, attempts at dialogue, including a personal letter to President Bush,[99] were dismissed by U.S. officials,[100] while public tensions grew over Iran’s nuclear program, U.S. foreign policy, and Ahmadinejad’s controversial remarks at international forums. The United States intensified covert operations against Iran, including alleged support for militant groups such as PEJAK and Jundullah, cross-border activities, and expanded CIA and Special Forces missions. Iran was repeatedly accused by the U.S. of arming and training Iraqi insurgents, including Shiite militias and groups linked to Hezbollah, with American officials citing captured weapons, satellite images, and detainee testimonies. During this period, additional flashpoints included the U.S. raid on Iran's consulate in Erbil, sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, a naval dispute in the Strait of Hormuz, and the public disclosure of covert action plans against Iran.

Obama administration 2009–2017

[edit]
Main article: Iran–United States relations during the Obama administration

Iran–United States relations during the Obama administration (2009–2017) were defined by a shift from confrontation to cautious engagement, culminating in the landmark nuclear agreement of 2015.
At the start of Obama’s presidency, both sides exchanged public messages signaling a possible thaw, with Iran voicing long-standing grievances[101] and the United States calling for mutual respect and responsibility.[102] However, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election in 2009, which sparked mass protests and allegations of fraud, the United States responded with skepticism and concern.[103] In late 2011 and early 2012, Iranian military officials threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz,[104] a vital waterway for global oil shipments, and warned a U.S. aircraft carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf. The United States rejected the warning and maintained its naval presence in the region, while experts questioned Iran’s capacity to sustain a blockade for more than a limited period.[105][106]
The 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, seen as a moderate,[107] marked a shift in tone, with his outreach at the UN and a historic phone call with Obama signaling renewed diplomatic engagement.[108][109] While high-level contact resumed and symbolic gestures were exchanged, conservative backlash in Iran highlighted internal divisions over rapprochement.[110] In 2015, the United States and other world powers reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.[111] The agreement marked a major diplomatic achievement for the Obama administration, though it faced skepticism in Congress and mixed public support in the U.S.

Trump administration, first term 2009–2017

[edit]
Main article: Iran–United States relations during the first Trump administration

Iran–United States relations during the first Trump administration (2017–2021) were marked by a sharp shift in policy, driven by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and a shift toward maximum pressure on Iran.

Biden administration 2021-2025

[edit]
Main article: Iran–United States relations during the Biden administration

Iran–United States relations during the Biden administration have focused on efforts to revive the nuclear agreement, amid ongoing regional tensions and mutual mistrust.

Trump administration, second term 2025-present

[edit]
Main articles: Trump's letter to Iran and US-Iran nuclear negotiations

In February 2025, Trump said he had given United States Military and his advisors instructions to obliterate Iran if he were to be assassinated.[112] He signed the return of the Maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian government.[113] Trump called for talks for Nuclear peace agreement.[114] In February 7th prayer Iranian Leader Khamenei dismissed negotiations and warned Iranian government not to make a deal with US.[115] February 9th Trump threatened that he rather Iranians would make a deal than be bombed by Israel.[116][117] In March khamenei claimed he does not intend to go to negotiations with Trump.[118] IRGC General Salami threteaned United States military with devastation.[119] POTUS Trump threatened he would hold Iranian regime to blame for any shots fired by Houthis.[120]

Putin and Trump reached an agreement that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.[121]

In April, Ali Larijani, advisor to Khamenei, threatened Trump that Iran would make nuclear weapons.[122] Islamic Republic military allegedly had recommended a preemptively strike on US military bases.[123]

In April President Trump stated that Iranians want direct negotiations.[124] US-Iran nuclear negotiations began on 12 April 2025.[125]

In April 2025, U.S. Congressmen Joe Wilson and Jimmy Panetta introduced a 'Free Iraq from Iran' bill. The legislation mandates the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to irreversibly dismantle Iran-backed militias, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and calls for the suspension of U.S. assistance to Iraq until these militias are fully removed. The bill also imposes sanctions on Iraqi political and military figures aligned with Iran, and provides support for Iraqi citizens and independent media to expose abuses committed by these militias. Its primary objective is to restore Iraq’s sovereignty and reduce Iranian dominance without resorting to direct military intervention.[126]

Economic relations

[edit]
See also: United States sanctions against Iran, Economy of the United States, Economy of Iran, Agriculture in Iran, Healthcare in Iran, and Iran–United States copyright relations

Trade between Iran and the United States reached $623 million in 2008. According to the United States Census Bureau, American exports to Iran reached $93 million in 2007 and $537 million in 2008. American imports from Iran decreased from $148 million in 2007 to $86 million in 2008.[127] This data does not include trade conducted through third countries to circumvent the trade embargo. It has been reported that the United States Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 special licenses to American companies over the past decade to conduct business with Iran.[128]

US exports to Iran include[when?] cigarettes (US$73 million); corn (US$68 million); chemical wood pulp, soda or sulfate (US$64 million); soybeans (US$43 million); medical equipment (US$27 million); vitamins (US$18 million); and vegetable seeds (US$12 million).[127]

In May 2013, US President Barack Obama lifted a trade embargo of communications equipment and software to non-government Iranians.[129] In June 2013, the Obama administration expanded its sanctions against Iran, targeting its auto industry and, for the first time, its currency.[130]

Fourth match between Iran and the US during the 2015 FIVB Volleyball World League

According to a 2014 study by the National Iranian American Council, sanctions cost the US over $175 billion in lost trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities.[131]

According to Business Monitor International:

The tentative rapprochement between Iran and the US, which began in the second half of 2013, has the potential to become a world-changing development, and unleash tremendous geopolitical and economic opportunities, if it is sustained. Tehran and Washington have been bitter enemies since 1979, when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the pro-American Shah and replaced him with a virulently anti-American Islamist regime. Since then, Iran has been at the vanguard of countries actively challenging the US-led world order. This has led to instability in the Middle East, and Iran's relative isolation in international affairs. Yet, if Iran and the US were to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could decline sharply, and Iran could come to be perceived as a promising emerging market in its own right.[132]

On 22 April 2019, under the Trump administration, the U.S. demanded that buyers of Iranian oil stop purchases or face economic penalties, announcing that the six-month sanction exemptions for China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey instated a year prior would not be renewed and would end by 1 May. The move was seen as an attempt to completely stifle Iran's oil exports. Iran insisted the sanctions were illegal and that it had attached "no value or credibility" to the waivers. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said President Trump's decision not to renew the waivers showed his administration was "dramatically accelerating our pressure campaign in a calibrated way that meets our national security objectives while maintaining well supplied global oil markets".[133] On 30 April, Iran stated it would continue to export oil despite U.S. pressure.[134]

On 8 May 2019, exactly one year after the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the U.S. imposed a new layer of duplicate sanctions on Iran, targeting its metal exports, a sector that generates 10 percent of its export revenue. The move came amid escalating tension in the region and just hours after Iran threatened to start enriching more uranium if it did not get relief from U.S. measures that are crippling its economy. The Trump administration has said the sanctions will only be lifted if Iran fundamentally changes its behavior and character.[135]

On 24 June 2019, following continued escalations in the Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump announced new targeted sanctions against Iranian and IRGC leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his office. IRGC targets included Naval commander Alireza Tangsiri, Aerospace commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and Ground commander Mohammad Pakpour, and others.[136][137] U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the sanctions will block "billions" in assets.[138]

The US Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network imposed a measure that further prohibits the US banking system from use by an Iranian bank, thereby requiring US banks to step up due diligence on the accounts in their custody.[139]

The US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blacklisted four Iranian metal sector organizations along with their foreign subsidiaries, on 23 July 2020. One German subsidiary and three in the United Arab Emirates – owned and controlled by Iran's biggest steel manufacturer, Mobarakeh Steel Company – were also blacklisted by Washington for yielding millions of dollars for Iran's aluminum, steel, iron, and copper sectors. The sanctions froze all US assets controlled by the companies in question and further prohibited Americans from associating with them.[140][141]

On October 8, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department placed sanctions on 18 Iranian banks. Any American connection to these banks is to be blocked and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and, 45 days after the sanctions take effect, anyone transacting with these banks may "be subject to an enforcement action." Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the goal was to pressure Iran to end nuclear activities and terrorist funding.[142]

On 30 October 2020, it was revealed that the US had "seized Iranian missiles shipped to Yemen", and it had "sold 1.1 million barrels of previously seized Iranian oil that was bound for Venezuela" in two shipments: the Liberia-flagged Euroforce and Singapore-flagged Maersk Progress, and sanctioned 11 new Iranian entities.[143]

See also

[edit]

Footnotes

[edit]
  1. ^ Arab leaders saw Iran as the biggest threat to regional peace, according to diplomatic cables that were leaked in 2010. Despite this, they refused to speak publicly, privately warning US officials that doing so would put them in danger of domestic unrest.(see Trager, Eric. "Behind the Arabs' Iran double talk". New York Post.) According to the cables, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were in favor of a military strike against Iran to halt its nuclear development.(See "Wikileaks Exposed Iran's Weak Foreign Policies, Says Opposition". Haaretz.)
  2. ^ See for example 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, which says Arab people in six countries believe that Iran has the right to have its nuclear program and should not be pressured to stop this program.

References

[edit]
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Further reading

[edit]
  • Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. and Abbas Maleki, Iran's Foreign Policy After September 11. Booksurge, 2008.
  • Aliyev, Tural. "The Evaluation of the Nuclear Weapon Agreement with Iran in the Perspective of the Difference Between Obama and Trump's Administration." R&S-Research Studies Anatolia Journal 4.1: 30–40. online
  • Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2016).
  • Bill, James A (1988). The Eagle and the Lion: the tragedy of American-Iranian relations. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300040975.
  • Blight, James G. and Janet M. Lang, et al. Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).
  • Chitsazian, Mohammad Reza, and Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi. "An Iranian Perspective on Iran–US Relations: Idealists Versus Materialists." Strategic Analysis 43.1 (2019): 28–41. online
  • Clinton, Hillary Rodham. Hard Choices (2014) under Obama; pp 416–446.
  • Collier, David R. Democracy and the nature of American influence in Iran, 1941-1979 (Syracuse University Press, 2017.)
  • Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 2011, ISBN 9781439157138.
  • Cordesman, Anthony H. "Iran and US Strategy: Looking beyond the JCPOA." (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021). online
  • Cottam, Richard W. "Human rights in Iran under the Shah." Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 12 (1980): 121+ online.
  • Cottam, Richard W. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (1988) on the fall of the Shah
  • Crist, David. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, Penguin Press, 2012.
  • Cronin, Stephanie. The making of modern Iran: state and society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941 (Routledge, 2003).
  • Emery, Christian. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
  • Gasiorowski, Mark J. "U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat in Iran during the Mossadegh Era." Journal of Cold War Studies 21.3 (2019): 185–221. online
  • Ghazvinian, John. America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present (2021), a major scholarly history excerpt
  • Harris, David., The Crisis: the President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam, (2004).
  • Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein. Iran: The Untold Story: An Insider's Account of America's Iranian Adventure and Its Consequences for the Future. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
  • Johns, Andrew L. "The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of US-Iranian Relations, 1965–1967: 'Tired of Being Treated like a Schoolboy'." Journal of Cold War Studies 9.2 (2007): 64–94. online
  • Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh (2023). Heroes to Hostages: America and Iran, 1800–1988. Cambridge University Press.
  • Katzman, Kenneth. Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy. (2017).
  • Kinch, Penelope. "The Iranian Crisis and the Dynamics of Advice and Intelligence in the Carter Administration." Journal of Intelligence History 6.2 (2006): 75–87.
  • Ledeen, Michael A., and William H. Lewis. "Carter and the fall of the Shah: The inside story." Washington Quarterly 3.2 (1980): 3–40.
  • Leverett, Flynt: Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic (Picador, 2013)
  • Mabon, Simon. "Muting the trumpets of sabotage: Saudi Arabia, the US and the quest to securitize Iran." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 45.5 (2018): 742–759. online
  • Moens, Alexander. "President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah." Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (1991): 211–237. online
  • Offiler, Ben. US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah (Springer, 2015).
  • Offiler, Ben. ""A spectacular irritant": US–Iranian relations during the 1960s and the World's Best Dressed Man." The Historian (2021): 1-23, about Khaibar Khan Gudarzian. online
  • Rostam-Kolayi, Jasamin. "The New Frontier Meets the White Revolution: The Peace Corps in Iran, 1962‒76." Iranian Studies 51.4 (2018): 587–612.
  • Rubin, Barry M. (1980). Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195028058.
  • Saikal, Amin. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (2019)
  • Shannon, Michael K. "American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era," Diplomatic History 39 (Sept. 2015), 661–88.
  • Shannon, Michael K. Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War (2017) excerpt
  • Slavin, Barbara (2007). Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US, and the Twisted Path to Confrontation. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 9780312368258. OCLC 493683087.
  • Summitt, April R. "For a white revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran." Middle East Journal 58.4 (2004): 560–575. online
  • Torbat, Akbar E. "A Glance at US Policies toward Iran: Past A_GLANCE_AT_US_POLICIES_TOWARD_IRAN and Present," Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 2004), pp. 85–94.
  • Waehlisch, Martin. "The Iran-United States Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 37 (Spring 2012), pp. 23–34.
  • Wise, Harold Lee. Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
  • Wright, Steven. The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror. (Ithaca Press, 2007).

Historiography

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  • Schayegh, Cyrus. "'Seeing Like a State': An Essay on the Historiography of Modern Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42#1 (2010): 37–61.
  • Shannon, Kelly J. "Approaching the Islamic World". Diplomatic History 44.3 (2020): 387–408, historical focus on US views of Iran.
  • Shannon, Matthew K. "Reading Iran: American academics and the last shah." Iranian Studies 51.2 (2018): 289–316. online[dead link]
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